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23 April 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE  
(FOUO 24/79)

WEST

EUROPE

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## TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

MISSIONS OF MARITIME PATROL AVIATION COMMAND DESCRIBED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 10, Feb 79 pp 26-28

[Article by Jean de Galard and Captain Mosneron Dupin, French Navy: "Maritime Patrol Aviation Command"]

[Text] The French Navy's priority mission is to ensure successful employment of its strategic missile-launching of nuclear submarines (SNLE). In conjunction with its nuclear response capability, the navy must also maintain a maritime action capability indissociable from the former, a capability with multiple mandatory objectives: prevention or control of crises not amenable to the strategy of deterrence, maintenance of the French flag's influence, and protection of national interests. But the French Navy is not solely an ocean-going fighting force. Not all of its assigned tasks involve weapons employment. Its regular peacetime activity has various aspects: rescuing persons at sea, medical evacuation, protecting and assisting fishermen, relief aid to civilian victims of natural disasters, participation in scientific expeditions, surveillance and control of pollution of ocean waters in France's sea approaches. In addition to its carrier-based aircraft--a subject recently given extensive coverage in this magazine in connection with the operational introduction of the Super Etendard aircraft--and its helicopter units that will soon be the center of considerable interest when the Lynx helicopter is placed in service, French Naval Aviation has a maritime patrol force whose unified command was established on 1 October 1973 and groups all personnel and equipment required to conduct long-range aerial maritime surveillance missions. Captain Mosneron Dupin has commanded PATMAR [Maritime Patrol Aviation Command] since 1 December 1978 and is being promoted to rear admiral effective 1 March 1979. We

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asked him to detail for us PATMAR's missions, personnel, equipment, and activities. We thank him for the interview he so graciously gave us. This article is based on that interview.

Two Bases, 47 Aircraft, Five Flights

We shall first briefly review the French Navy's organizational structure so as to better identify PATMAR's role and position within that structure. The navy's highest echelon consists of the chief of the naval staff, his staff, and various directorates. France's coastline is divided into three naval districts: 1st District with headquarters in Cherbourg, 2d District in Brest, and 3d District in Toulon. In addition to their adjacent maritime space, these districts comprise all port, industrial, logistical, and administrative facilities supporting the forces stationed therein. Each district is headed by an admiral, the district commandant ("prefet maritime") who being responsible in a way for overall management of the facilities has authority over all naval activities in his district. To exercise national sovereignty at sea, he is invested with regulatory powers for policing traffic or stationing in coastal waters. He also has a primary role in navy public service activities.

For purposes of monitoring, safeguarding, and defending French interests throughout the world, the ocean surfaces of the globe are divided into eight maritime command areas. Authority over these areas is assigned either to district commanders--such is the case with the English Channel, North Atlantic, and Mediterranean areas--or to naval commanders.

The command of forces inherently includes authority and responsibility for bringing those forces up to a proper state of readiness and maintaining them in such state. Operational command is the authority granted in everything related to the immediate preparation of operations and their direction or execution.

In the event of a crisis or conflict, district commanders of the 2d and 3d Naval Districts may be appointed Commander in Chief Atlantic (CECLANT) and Commander in Chief Mediterranean (CECMED) respectively. To facilitate a smooth transition from time of peace to time of crisis and help maintain continuity and unity of command, CECLANT and CECMED are assigned, in peacetime, air and naval forces necessary for such priority missions as support of the strategic forces and defense of the sea approaches. These forces consist mainly of the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets, minesweeping flotillas, and flights of the Maritime Patrol Aviation Command.

Before the Maritime Patrol Aviation Command was established, there were two naval air groups: the 2d Group based in Lann-Bihoue with headquarters in Brest (2d Naval District) and the 3d Group based in Nimes-Garons with headquarters in Toulon. Ever since PATMAR's activation on 1 October 1973, its headquarters have been on the Dugny-Le Bourget naval air base.

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PATMAR is a separate command "charged with providing personnel, equipment, and facilities, and directing their employment." It is responsible for maintaining personnel and equipment in a state of operational readiness. It directs flight crew instruction and training, develops employment tactics, and ensures standardization of operating procedures. The command's major items of equipment are its 47 maritime patrol aircraft: 35 BR-1150 Atlantics and 12 P2V7 Neptunes, 38 of which are operational. All aircraft are based at Lann-Bihoue and Nimes-Garons. Two flights of Atlantics--Flight 23 and Flight 24 each consisting of seven aircraft--are stationed in Lann-Bihoue along with Flight 25 equipped with 10 Neptunes. Each Atlantic flight is assigned nine 10-member flight crews. Flights 21 and 22, each equipped with seven Atlantics, are based at Nimes-Garons.

The chain of command extends from the ALPATMAR--Admiral Commanding Maritime Patrol Aviation Command--to flight commanders via naval air district headquarters (2d and 3d Naval Districts) and local naval air headquarters at Lann-Bihoue and Nimes-Garons.

PATMAR Missions

PATMAR conducts three types of missions. On the strictly military level, it operationally supports the Strategic Naval Force (FOST) by helping that force maintain its high standards. It monitors communications of SNLE's for security violations and assists in reconnaissance of SNLE sectors of operation.

On the military level but with some fallout on the civilian level, it flies freedom of the seas missions involving submarines and surface ships. PATMAR conducts reconnaissance flights in all naval theaters of operation, beginning with the sea approaches to French territory. These reconnaissance missions cover the entire Mediterranean and extend into the Atlantic to a distance of nearly 2,000 kilometers or 1,000 nautical miles. Patrol aircraft can also guide strike aircraft to their targets.

Public service missions flown by patrol aircraft are specifically assigned and/or happen by chance. SAR (Search and Rescue) missions for aircraft in distress are obviously specifically assigned missions: they are conducted within the purview of the ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] and for the French Air Force, the agency responsible for ordering search and rescue operations. Such missions as sea rescue, antipollution control, surveillance of fishing areas, and police of shipping lanes may be specifically assigned: they are specific actions taken upon request in connection with ships reported in trouble, pleasure craft in distress, and the monitoring of the movement of oil slicks. Or they may be chance missions such as spotting ships in trouble or life rafts while flying a strictly military mission. All of these public service missions combined account for approximately 8 percent of the flying time logged by all PATMAR aircraft. With reference to antipollution control, it should be noted that PATMAR aircraft commanders are legally empowered to charge persons with violation of the law, but the amount of the fines imposed is not a deterrent, even though this amount was recently increased.

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Missions in desert areas stem from PATMAR's maritime capabilities that require its flight crews to be able to operate occasionally over vast expanses of desert.

Since 1972, PATMAR has been working for the Senegalese government on a partly reimbursable basis by flying those SAR missions incumbent upon Senegal pursuant to its membership in the ICAO. An Atlantic or Neptune aircraft based in Dakar is employed for these missions.

Lastly, PATMAR may be called upon to fly missions for those foreign governments with whom France has defense agreements. These missions may be of a deterrent nature or possibly intervention operations as was the case in 1978. The latter involved reconnaissance flights over insecure areas.

Since the creation of the new Republic of Djibouti, the French Navy has kept a Neptune aircraft in that country for the purpose of maintaining surveillance of the approaches to Djibouti under the terms of an agreement between the governments of the two countries. The Neptune aircraft and its crew are rotated monthly and are under the operational control of the admiral commanding French naval forces in the Indian Ocean area.

Eight Hours on Patrol, 13 Flying Hours

Following is a description of the capabilities of the Br-1150 Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft. Its 12-man crew includes: two pilots, one of whom is the aircraft commander; a tactical coordinator; two navigators, one for geographical navigation, the other for tactical navigation; a radar console operator; a radar signals monitor who also interprets and uses data furnished by the aircraft's Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD); two sonobuoy monitoring specialists; and three mechanics who also serve, inter alia, as observers making visual checks through the aircraft's side windows. An Atlantic aircraft powered by two Rolls-Royce 6,000 HP turboprop Tyne engines can patrol for 8 hours in an area 600 nautical miles from its base and return to base upon completion of its patrol. One of the aircraft's outstanding qualities is its endurance: 13 flying hours, 8 of them on station.

The arrangement and diameter of its viewing windows enable the Atlantic crew to effectively conduct visual sighting missions equally above water and in the middle of the desert.

Other advantages of the Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft lie in the detection capabilities of its radar, its equipment for high-altitude monitoring of distress-signalling beacons, and in interpretation and use of acoustic data transmitted by the Jezebel sonobuoys it drops over suspected areas. An equally rich source of information is the MAD system, on condition, of course, that the aircraft is in perfect trim. MAD equipment cannot pinpoint a submarine's exact location but can verify its presence for attack purposes.



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For employment against surface ships, Atlantic patrol aircraft are armed with AS-12 missiles soon to be replaced by AM-39 [Exocet air-to-surface] missiles and Martel antiradar missiles. The capability of guiding such strike aircraft as the Etendard 4, Jaguar, and Super Etendard to their targets may be considered another one of the Br-1150 Atlantic's "weapons."

Some 18,000 Flying Hours in 1978

All the aircraft in PATMAR's inventory logged a total of 18,000 flying hours in 1978, 60 percent of which were flown during actual operations, in other words, not in flight crew training. Public service activities accounted for 1,500 hours or about 8 percent of the total. The latter included about 90 hours in SAR operations and more than 600 hours in sea rescue operations. Yet 1978 was exceptional in this latter respect because of the SECMAR [Sea Rescue] operations conducted late in the year in the search for participants in the "Rum Race" [ocean yacht race] including [the still missing] Alain Colas.

Training flights are conducted at the flight commander's discretion. Operational flights are conducted as part of specifically assigned missions. The PATMAR commander has the dual task of constituting well-knit operational flight crews and avoiding any specialization of crews in this or that particular type of mission.

Public service missions will no doubt become more demanding during the next few years. Antipollution control missions will extend beyond their traditional scope to include control of shipping for accident prevention purposes. Sea rescue missions will demand more and more flying hours as a result of expanding pleasure boat activity. Surveillance of fishing in certain "hot" sections of the globe will also take up a large part of the available flying time, particularly in the Pacific, in the approaches to the Kerguelen Archipelago, and in Guiana where surveillance of the fishing area requires dispatching an aircraft (rotated every 2 months) to Fort-de-France [Martinique]. Lastly, surveillance and protection will have to be provided for offshore oil rigs.

It should be remembered, however, that the military programming law took into account only the French Navy's military expenditures. Another point to be remembered is that naval district commanders are responsible to the prime minister for surveillance of France's 200-nautical mile economic zone and accomplish this task by coordinating their defense means and those of the other government departments concerned, such as the merchant navy, interior, and PTT [Postal and Telecommunications Administration] among others.

Atlantic NG Aircraft in 1985

PATMAR can "hold on" with its P2V7 Neptunes until the late 1980's. The Atlantics are expected to reach the end of their service life in the period 1985-1990 with a sharp decline in their capabilities and number during those

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last 5 years. Hence the appearance of the first Atlantic New Generation (NG) aircraft in PATMAR units about 1985 will be most welcome.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

AIR FORCE RECAPITULATES 1978 ACTIVITIES

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 10 Feb 79 pp 28, 40

[Article: "Air Force Recapitulates its Activities in 1978"]

[Text] The February 1979 issue of the French Air Force's monthly news magazine AIR ACTUALITES carried an article summarizing the air force's main activities in 1978. The article also contained a progress report on the status of major air force programs as of 31 December 1978. We have extracted the essential parts of this article that recapitulates and completes the information we have published throughout the year.

Total of 430,000 Flying Hours

The total of approximately 430,000 hours logged by air force aircraft in 1978 represents an increase of 7.5% over the 1977 total. Included in this total are individual training flights within each unit and flying time during the participation by certain units in collective training exercises. The most important of these exercises were: "Datex," an air defense exercise; "Punch" and "Poker" involving employment of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons (these exercises are conducted several times a year); "Pegase" and "Texel," joint 1st Army-FATAC [Tactical Air Force] exercises; and "Fatma," four joint air force-navy exercises involving attack operations at sea. The air force also participated in certain NATO exercises "so as to test procedures that would enable it to fight alongside the allies should the French government decide accordingly."

It must also be noted here that air units flew not only regular training and routine missions but also conducted military operations in foreign countries. For instance, COTAM [Military Air Transport Command] actively participated in the operations in Mauritania, Chad, and Zaire. It also transported French elements of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. The Tactical Air Force, supported by Strategic Air Force tanker aircraft, employed its aircraft in Mauritania and Chad.

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All Pilots Will be Officers

A measure approved in 1978 will have great impact on aircrew personnel in the coming years. Successful completion of pilot training will henceforth automatically admit such personnel to reserve student officer training. Upon completion of this training, the young pilot will be appointed officer candidate and attain the status of reserve officer on active duty once he has obtained the professional rating for which he was recruited. This new procedure will thus put an end to the peculiar situation whereby the French Air Force was the only Western air force whose pilots were not all officers.

Continued Equipment Development

The year 1978 was marked by the following developments relative to aircraft, weapons, detection equipment, and communications facilities:

- a. Development of the Transall transport aircraft's refueling capability; 28 of the new version Transall's will be produced with this capability.
- b. The first service firings of Magic air-to-air missiles and Crotale surface-to-air missiles by air force units demonstrated that these missile systems recently placed in service perform to perfection.
- c. Delivery of the first production-model Alpha Jet trainers, thereby allowing definition of policies and procedures for this aircraft's use in pilot training schools, and also enabling instructors to be trained so that the Alpha Jet can be readily placed in service in 1979.
- d. Withdrawal from operational alert status of part of the SSBS [Surface-to-Surface Strategic Ballistic Missiles] to allow installation in 1980 of the new generation of S-3 missiles whose qualification firings are proceeding very satisfactorily.
- e. Initiation of development of a reconnaissance version of the Mirage F1 designed to replace the Mirage 3R and subsequently the Mirage 3RD.
- f. Initial flights of the first two prototypes of the Mirage 2000: 10 March for aircraft No. 1 and 18 September for No. 2.
- g. First Satrape height-finding radars were installed and placed in service.
- h. Start of production of the Centaure air traffic control radars for air base use.
- i. End of operation RENAP begun in 1972 and during which 27 local airfield control systems were remodeled or replaced.

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j. Four new Instrument Landing Systems were placed in service on air bases in Nancy, Orange Metz, and Mururoa.

k. Continued installation of the RA70 [Air Force Radio Relay System] and electronic switching equipment.

Throughout 1978 the air force continued to intensify its efforts to improve the protection and defense of its installations against all types of threats, notably by building aircraft shelters, deploying Crotale missile and anti-aircraft gun batteries, and equipping base protection and security units with detection radars, night-vision devices, and automatic intruder detection systems.

Increased Technical Assistance

Technical military assistance furnished by the French Air Force to foreign air forces equipped with French-made materiel increased slightly in 1978. More than 1,000 foreign trainees received instruction last year at air force schools in France while nearly 400 air force officers and noncommissioned officers served abroad as technical advisers to foreign air forces.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

EQUIPMENT FOR COMBAT AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION OFFERED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 3 Mar 79 pp 20-21, 23

[Article by Gerard Collin: "Thomson-CSF Offers Equipment for Combat Aircraft Modernization"]

[Text] For the past several years, Thomson-CSF has offered various items of equipment for the modernization of combat aircraft. It is now further intensifying its marketing efforts. Its top-of-the-line items are the Agave radar, the Cyrano 4 MS radar, the TAV38 laser rangefinder, and the VE110 head up display.


Reduction of Excess Weight

The idea of modernizing combat aircraft already in service stems from exhaustive market studies and, in the final analysis, is based on the following considerations:

- a. Combat aircraft performance--ceiling, speed, operating range, etc.--evolve only very slowly. Aerodynamic advances and aircraft power plant advances are becoming more and more expensive. The cost of new aircraft is very high and mounting.
- b. On the other hand, however, airframes of "old" aircraft have a long service life, hence the temptation to retain these aircraft and simultaneously give them superior operational capabilities. It is at this point in the analysis of the situation that spectacular advances in electronics allow a compromise to be reached, a compromise that is more than satisfactory in that it also reduces equipment weight and volume. This means that airframes can be retrofitted with very modern high-performance equipment. The Agave radar mounted in the Super Etendard naval strike fighter weighs only 46 kilograms compared with the Mirage 3's 188-kilogram Cyrano 2 radar. Its antenna has a small 35-centimeter diameter but scanning and clutter filtering techniques amply compensate for this small diameter and give the Agave radar excellent performance characteristics. The same is true with the VE 110 head-up display

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Cyrano 4 MS radar in development stage. The outer ring or collar provides roll stabilization, as a similar ring does on the Agave radar.

unit whose modest dimensions allow it to fit in most cockpits while still offering a most effective field of view and symbology. Lastly, we need not recall that today a computer packaged in a 1/2 ATR short case provides a whole series of interface, storage, and computing speed capabilities.

Under these circumstances, almost every "old" aircraft can now aspire to attain a very high level of performance at a modernization cost merely some 10 to 20 percent of the cost of a new aircraft.


In other words, it can be said that miniaturization and the possibilities furnished by electronics offer many countries the only economically accessible solution, namely modernization of aircraft already in service. This is likewise the only conceivable approach for other countries that, for political or logistical reasons, cannot acquire such highly modern aircraft as the Mirage 2000 or the F-16. All in all, the market in question is quite large. A figure of 2,000 aircraft is sometimes mentioned. Thomson-CSF's goal is about 100 aircraft per year for the next few years.

#### A Wide Choice of Possibilities

Thomson-CSF's approach is consistent with the very nature of the target markets: they are heterogeneous. It is readily apparent that these aircraft differ

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Agave radar. Electronic printed-circuit boards can be seen on the rear part of the unit.

widely in their origins and in their dimensions, and consequently in the space available to house the equipment therein. They also differ in the known or assumed requirements of the air forces concerned.

The two radars offered are multimode systems, thereby enabling them to cover several operational fields. They are also complementary, the Agave being a basically maritime radar and the Cyrano 4 a basically land radar. This does not, however, rule out certain overlapping capabilities.

The head-up display system is available in three versions: VE 110, VE 120 (Super Etendard version), and VE 130. The numbers 110, 120, and 130 are actually dimensions of the collimating lens. These three versions permit mounting the sighting head that is best adapted to the aircraft. It must be realized, in fact, that optimum filling of the small space available below the windshield is often a matter of a few millimeters' clearance.

The electronics units of both the radar and the display unit can accommodate all types of interface, analog or digital. Computing speed is adequate for all conceivable applications. Memory modules are by "steps" of 18K words.

Thomson-CSF does not manufacture sensors, except angle-of-attack sensors. But here again, Thomson-CSF offers a wide range of possibilities whose complexity, cost, and performance are adapted to different requirements. A typical example of this modular approach is furnished by the attitude and navigation data.

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There are three possible levels. The first employs a twin-gyro attitude data generator--the one made by SFIM [Measurement Instruments Manufacturing Company] for example--without any self-contained navigation means. The next version retains the attitude data generator but has an associated Doppler navigation radar. This version can be further refined by an accelerometer-assisted Doppler-attitude statistical coupling. This coupling makes it possible to simultaneously improve short-range navigation (ground speed), the Doppler, and the attitude data generator. The most advanced version replaces the Doppler and the attitude data generator with an inertial platform: one made by SAGEM [Company for General Applications of Electricity and Mechanics] for example.

A final example of the possible combinations: for certain applications, the Thomson-CSF and CILAS [Industrial Laser Company] laser rangefinder may be substituted for the radar or appreciably enhance the radar's short-distance ranging accuracy, whether it be the Agave radar or the Cyrano radar.

This wide range of possibilities offered by Thomson-CSF has one key word. That word is "homogeneity." The respective capabilities of the components have to be integrated into an optimized system so as not to make a sensor needlessly "sophisticated" or conversely, so as not to compromise overall performance by an inordinately weak link. Thomson-CSF's experience and size offer a customer the comprehensive services of a prime contractor and not those of a mere supplier of juxtaposed "black boxes."

**TVA 39 Laser Rangefinder**


If an aircraft's primary mission is to attack ground targets, the Agave radar may be replaced by a TAV 38 laser rangefinder developed jointly by Thomson-CSF and CILAS. It may also be used to supplement the radar. Mirage 1 and Jaguar aircraft are equipped with the TAV 38. This laser range is composed of two main subassemblies:

- a. The laser head contains the laser system and the quartz clock that ensures highly accurate measurement of the laser pulse's return time. Weight: 9 kilograms. Wavelength: 1.06 micron.
- b. Power pack containing the various power supplies needed by the entire unit (3/4 ATR short case, 12 kilograms).

The TAV 38's principal characteristics are:

- a. Range measurement with an accuracy of 7 meters irrespective of distance.
- b. Maximum measurement range: 10 kilometers in clear weather.
- c. Capability of firing 12 rounds per minute, at a maximum rate of one round per second, but no limitation if rounds are fired at the rate of one every two seconds.

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BF radar detector unit.

Automatic guidance of the laser beam in elevation and azimuth serves to increase the system's tactical capabilities. This guidance is obtained by means of movable prisms that provide a scanning field of 200 mrad in elevation and 260 mrad in azimuth.

#### Cyrano 4 MS Radar

For aircraft with a primary mission of low-altitude penetration and ground attack, Thomson-CSF is developing a new Cyrano 4 MS radar specifically adapted to such a mission while retaining air-to-air combat capabilities approximating those of the Mirage F1's Cyrano 4 radar (interception and combat) from which this new version is derived. The latter will be available in 2 years.

The Cyrano 4 MS is designed for very low-altitude and bad weather penetration missions using the following operating modes: terrain following, anticollision, instrument letdown, radar display of ground with calculated fixed point, readjustment on this point as well as Doppler display with capability of magnifying the radar map around the fixed point.

In these operating modes, dangerous echoes will be displayed in red on the head-down CRT screen (based on measurements made of real ground clutter). A warning signal will alert the pilot whenever allowable tolerances have been exceeded.

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Air-to-ground ranging may be used for air-to-ground attack but also to check whether the system is operating properly during all-weather low-altitude penetration.

Air-to-air mission capabilities include: air-to-air search; automatic tracking; capability of firing guns or launching Matra 530, Matra Super 530, and Magic 550 missiles; adequate head-up display of information and air-to-air ranging.

From a technical standpoint, the Cyrano 4 MS radar is a conventional I-band radar equipped with an inverted Cassegrain antenna. Doppler beam-sharpening around the calculated fixed point and 20 degrees beyond the aircraft's heading provide high-resolution radar mapping around this point in the ground display mode. Magnification of this area ("magnifying glass"), enables the pilot to accurately read this map.

The Cyrano 4 MS radar operates in conjunction with a new television-tube digital readout device that enhances the radar display and makes the system easier to use in flight: display of dangerous obstacles, great flexibility in the presentation of symbols, and a long-range optical target identification system.

#### Agave Radar

For combat aircraft with primary air-to-sea missions, Thomson-CSF offers the Agave radar produced jointly with Marcel Dassault Electronics for the Mirage 5 and the French Navy's Super Etendard. This light multirole radar also has excellent air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities.

It can be employed for the following functions:

- a. Air-to-air: air-to-air search, automatic tracking, target designation with head-up display, and air-to-air ranging.
- b. Air-to-sea: air-to-sea search, automatic tracking of surface targets, target designations, and air-to-sea ranging.
- c. Air-to-ground: navigation and air-to-ground ranging.

Considering its reduced size--diameter: 490 millimeters; length: 610 millimeters--and lightweight--fuselage nose: 45 kilograms--and its low consumption of electric power--1.1 kilowatts--this radar's capabilities are remarkable. In air-to-air search, it can detect a light bomber at up to 15 nautical miles (27 kilometers). In air-to-sea search, it can detect a destroyer at more than 60 nautical miles (110 kilometers). The radar scans 140 degrees in azimuth and 60 degrees in elevation.

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In air-to-ground ranging, measurement is so accurate that the final error it introduces into fire correction computations is of the same order of magnitude as that of the other components of the complete weapon system.

From a technical standpoint, the Agave radar is a conventional magnetron I(X)-band radar. It uses an inverted Cassegrain antenna. The monopulse receiver provides precise automatic tracking.

VE 110, VE 120, VE 130 Head-Up Display Systems

Thomson-CSF has delivered more than 5,000 monochrome display units to date. The VE's consist of a symbol generator (1/2 ATR shortcase), the cathode-ray tube and its THT power supply mounted under the windshield, and lastly, the collimating optics. The latter offer a wide field of view (20 degrees) thanks to the use of a twin combining glass. The sighting head--cathode-ray tube plus optics--weighs only 8.5 kilograms and has optimum "mountability." Symbology remains fully visible under brightness of 12,000 FL [footlamberts]. The head-up display is suitable for all operating modes: air-to-ground, air-to-sea, and air-to-air. A camera may be employed for recording or instructional purposes. Its adaptability has already been demonstrated on the following aircraft: Super Etendard, Jaguar, Mirage 3, Mirage 5, Mirage 50, and the A-4 Skyhawk.

We shall conclude our survey of Thomson-CSF equipment with the BF radar detector unit. Production models of this unit already equip the Mirage 3, Mirage 5, Mirage F1 and F5, as well as the Super Etendard. It detects radars locked-on to its carrier aircraft by means of four antennas covering the S, C, X, and KU bands, i.e. from 2 to 15 gigahertz. All these units have built-in test and monitoring circuits and servicing equipment.

Many contacts have already been made in connection with the foreign-built aircraft market: A-4, F-5, F-8, BAC, etc. These discussions have been held with both aircraft manufacturers and firms specializing in aircraft modification. To mention but a few: Vought, Lockheed, Aero Services, General Dynamics, Northrop, Lear Siegler, and E-Systems. In many cases, however, the retrofitting work will be handled directly with the original manufacturer of the aircraft, for instance, with Dassault for everything involving the modernization of Mirage aircraft.

The most likely competition in the head-up display is from such British firms as Marconi and Smiths Industries. As for the radars, Agave's compactness ought to bring Thomson-CSF a great deal of success.

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COUNTRY SECTION

PORTUGAL

ITALIAN MAGAZINE INTERVIEWS MARIO SOARES

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 13 Mar 79 pp 69, 70

[Interview with Mario Soares, Secretary of the Portuguese Socialist Party, by PANORAMA during the Socialist Congress, March 2-4, place not given]

[Text] Question: There is much talk about supposed dangers to Portuguese democracy. What do you think?

Answer: I do not think that at this time political and military conditions exist for a takeover by the far left or by the far right. But from a strictly democratic point of view the situation is unclear. The present government does not represent the will of the people. It was put together through the efforts of the president of the republic, who bypassed the political parties. This is not a normal situation in a parliamentary democracy like ours. And then, this government has proved to be right wing, with right wing policies. It has made various decisions that contradict the most sincere hopes of the people. And it is criticized by the left, which is to say, the majority of Portuguese people.

Question: How come there is a right wing government in a country with a socialist constitution and with a Socialist Party which is the strongest of its political forces?

Answer: It is the fault of the antidemocratic attitude of the Communist Party which in 1975 tried to seize power by force. This kept us from unifying with the communists. The Portuguese Communist Party was, in fact, trying to unite with the left as a means of extending its power over all the left. If we had accepted the Communist Party's strategy we probably would have stopped the development of democratic forces in Portugal.

Question: How is it that the socialists with 36 percent of the vote are not in control of the government? Is it true that someone has abolished the right to vote?

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Answer: The socialists could not accept one or two ministers in a government whose head does not represent the will of the people. The Socialist Party has 102 seats in parliament, more than 20,000 representatives in various local governments, more than 100,000 members; we cannot possibly agree to be part of this government since it would not reflect the results of political elections in which we won a relative majority of the votes. We still think that the results of general elections are a rather accurate thermometer of the will of the people. The president of the republic, so it would seem, is not of the same opinion.

Question: When the first constitutional government fell in December of 1977, President Eanes declared that if the government were to be formed by the political parties, they would have to obtain a clear majority in parliament. Because the parties were not able to reach an agreement, Portugal now has a government that is not an expression of the parties and which was ratified in parliament because the socialists refused to take part in the vote of no confidence presented by the communists. How can this deadlock be resolved?

Answer: Up until this point we socialists have preferred to form alliances with neither the left nor with the right. We have felt this was the best choice in order to avoid bipolarization of Portuguese society, which would be extremely bad for democratic forces and for the social progress of the country, given the current situation. But, seeing that President Ramalho Eanes is now sticking to his decision for a government clearly by the majority, either the parties must change their positions or we will not have a government formed by parties in Portugal, and there will be new and very serious risks for democracy.

Question: Does this mean that the socialists will try to reach an understanding of the situation, in effect abandoning their policy of nonalliance? Will there probably be a government between socialists and social democrats?

Answer: An understanding will, I believe, require elections during a stable period of time, or to be less optimistic about it, early elections.

Question: Do you agree with those who insist it is necessary to change the socialist constitution, even though it is brand new?

Answer: Any modification of the constitution should not be a complete reworking of the one we already have. Only parliament, which will be chosen by the next elections, as our constitution clearly states, can undertake this revision. For many reasons we are opposed to referendums and plebiscites.

Question: What do you think of the constant demands from the right to entrust greater powers to the president of the republic?

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Answer: The personalization of power is one of the classic systems used by the right to frustrate and deny the hopes of the people. When we talk of the "institutional leadership" of the president we are facing an attempt to regress, to play once more the traditional game of the Portuguese right, which through personalization of power aims to destroy the progress of the people toward democracy and real social progress.

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COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

BASQUE NATIONALISTS PRESS DEMANDS ON MADRID

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 25 Mar 79 pp 16-19, 21, 22

[Text] Without becoming an emergency the matter is being lived and felt with concern in Madrid. An unofficial spokesman of the Ministry of Interior told CAMBIO 16 last week that as far as Martin Villa is concerned, the position of Herri Batasuna [United People] of defending an independent socialist and Basque state was completely inadmissible "because it denies the unity of Spain."

"Not To Retreat a Millimeter"

Sectors of the Army, even the most liberal, expressed themselves in a like manner. "Our position," said a colonel of the Ministry of Defense to CAMBIO 16, "is not to retreat a millimeter. Statements like those of Herri Batasuna last week, denying the Spanish nature of the Basque territory, are questions a united and disciplined army like ours cannot tolerate."

Elsewhere, parliamentary sources of the UCD [Democratic Center Union] preferred not to discuss the subject in official statements. Its position is that the parliamentarians of Herri Batasuna must go to congress, take possession of their seats, and attend sessions regularly. If they do not, the pertinent sanctions must be imposed on them, if necessary, taking away their status as parliamentarians.

Apparently the UCD is trying to have the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] place the parliamentarians of Herri Batasuna into their parliamentary group and "domesticate" them, emphasizing the possibility that in this fashion the Herri Batasuna parliamentarians would never intervene again as spokesmen of the Basque nationalists parliamentary group in delicate questions, but that in those cases, the spokesman would always be Arzallus or any other PNV spokesman.

Alfonso Guerra of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], says that they are democrats and, therefore, it is not difficult for them to accept the result of the elections, which means that the Socialist Party thinks it is very proper that Herri Batasuna won parliamentary seats and they are not sorry about it. "Those who are sorry now," he comments, "are the UCD and the government for their irresponsible policy in the Basque Country, aimed primarily at undermining the socialist presence in that region."

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Let Them Settle It

Guerra adds: "They accused us of the PSOE of maintaining ambiguous positions on the subject of the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group], they rejected Txiki Benegas because he did not discard the possibility of negotiating with the ETA and now they take notice they have done things so badly that they have seated the ETA in Parliament. Let them not turn to us to quiet the members of Herri Batasuna because we are not going to do it."

The PCE [Spanish Communist Party] also agrees broadly with that evaluation. "If the UCD had not given the Basque Country a treatment characteristic of that of the Franco regime, when they should have carried out a political series of transfers to the Basque General Council, things would have progressed in another manner," said Enrique Curiel, secretary of the communist parliamentary group, to this magazine.

As far as the PCE is concerned, the present situation can lead to a very serious period if the separation of the Basque Country continues to become accentuated with respect to the Spanish democratic process. If errors continue to be made, this separation will lead to an increase in the radical independentist options and a vicious circle will be initiated from which it will be necessary to emerge by any means.

This emergence for Carrillo's party is still possible if a statute of autonomy is approved with maximum urgency, a statute which involves all the political forces, including the nationalists.

What Herri Batasuna Is

Herri Batasuna (United People in the Basque language) originated as an electoral coalition in May 1978 for the purpose of "liberating Euskadi and constructing Socialism."

Made up of two legal parties, Basque Nationalist Action [ANV] and Basque Socialist Party (ESB), and two illegal, Peoples' Revolutionary Socialist Party (HASI) and Revolutionary Party of Patriotic Workers (LAIA), it was formed "as a permanent table for debate, as an electoral axis and for the mobilization of the masses," for "the desired unity of the nationalist left."

Its political program consists exclusively of six points:

Democratic freedoms with recognition of the right to self-determination and legalization of all parties.

Recognition of the full sovereignty of the Basque nation and its territorial integrity (inclusion of Navarra) in a statute of autonomy.

Institutionalization and preferential support of the Basque language.

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Urgent democratization of the local administration.

Improvement of the living conditions for the working class.

Total amnesty and the progressive withdrawal of the forces of public order and the police.

The political program completely assumes the claims of the Patriotic Socialist Workers Committee (KAS) which is made up of HASI and LAIA and which the military ETA considers "The only valid spokesman for a possible negotiation with the government on the basis of these points." The four parliamentarians (three deputies and one senator) elected by Herri Batasuna on 1 March, have already made public their decision to "negotiate these points directly with the government without resorting to the Spanish Parliament because we are not Spaniards."

Herri Batasuna obtained 150,000 votes in the Basque Country and 22,500 in Navarra in the past elections. In four municipalities of Vizcaya, 23 of Guipuzcoa and one of Alava, it obtained an absolute majority. Some of those municipalities are of great importance, as is the case of Hernani, Pasajes and Oyarzun.

The nationalist coalition will be competing in 154 of the 228 municipalities of the Basque Country in the next municipal elections.

Increased Combativity

In the Basque Country, where CAMBIO 16 sent two reporters and a photographer last week, the subject was viewed in a different way: "Mass mobilizations and measures of forces capable of wresting the autonomy statute for Euskadi from Madrid is what we shall put into effect after the municipal elections. No one can expect that there be peace in our land if the central government does not adopt political measures on the bases established by our coalition." At the Bilbao headquarters of the Herri Batasuna coalition at Number 18 Perez Galdos Street, no one hides the euphoria or the increased combativity caused by the 1 March electoral results. "We are the second or third force in worker and immigrant zones, we are the first Basque force in Guipuzcoa; if we join with Euskadiko Eskerra we are the first Basque force of the left," enumerates Inaki Lasagabaster victoriously. He is the spokesman of the coalition which represents the independentist ideology of the military ETA.

In the "second round," as the nationalists of Herri Batasuna call the municipal elections, they expect the results to be even more spectacular. "The other parties of the left do not have any representation in Euskadi. There are many city governments in which the left is not present, therefore, the votes of the left will come to us inevitably," speculated Lasagabaster.

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Once the councilmen are obtained, Herri Batasuna expects to do something more than administer the city governments. Together with the "junteros" (provincial parliamentarians) and representatives of mass organizations, such as the antinuclear groups, the proamnesty committees, the KAS, and the neighborhood associations, they will form a "Basque Assembly" whose principal task will consist of preparing a statute of autonomy for the zone, different from the one which the previous Parliament presented to the General Basque Council.

"The bases for the statute are already established. All that is left to do is for the representatives of the Basque institutions to meet in the assembly and discuss them and develop them. This activity will make a great impression on the people, which will bring with it mobilizations of masses and the emergence of collective measures of force," is the confident expectation in Herri Batasuna. Because of them, they believe that Madrid will see itself forced to take political measures and finally accept the autonomous system of which the nationalists of the left dream. "If this jells it will surely be of great importance," exults Lasagabaster.

But they have no illusions that the fight will be easy. "We expect the Madrid government to react with all types of measures, including an invasion of a military type worse than the one we suffered against Euskadi. We also know that at any moment Spanish power can cause a bloody "Ulsterization" (conversion of the Basque Country into something similar to North Ireland)," says the Herri Batasuna spokesman. He adds: "We would not be surprised. We have information that 'black lists' of our leaders and members are being made in Madrid and it would not be unlikely that they will begin to exterminate us."

Nevertheless, Herri Batasuna remains firm. "Let us not forget that we are the only political alternative that is not assimilable into the Spanish capitalist system of exploitation. No one can expect there to be peace in the Basque Country as long as political measures are not taken. We are open to negotiations but always on the basis of the six points we have already expounded. Up to now the only reply we have had is the violence of the Spanish state: searches, blows and acts of brutality. They have achieved nothing more than to aggravate things. Political measures are needed and we are going to wrest them from Madrid by the power of the masses," insists Lasagabaster.

Meanwhile, the three deputies and one senator obtained in the elections last 1 March by Herri Batasuna will be used as world alarm bells on the Basque problem. The nationalists of the left will not allow participation in the parliamentary play of the problems of the Spanish state "that are of no interest to us." Francisco Ortzi Letamendia, Telesforo Monzon, Perico Solabarria and Miguel Castells will use their parliamentary prerogatives and immunities to act politically in and out of Spain. "They will go to the international forums to denounce the situation of Euskadi, bring up human rights, and call attention to our national problem," explains Lasagabaster

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almost at the same time that the deputies were traveling to the International Court of Justice at The Hague to deliver a "dossier" on the situation in the Basque Country.

In Herri Batasuna they do not doubt that the Madrid government will place all sorts of obstacles before them, but they believe that if the UCD does not obtain the support of the other parties, it will not be so easy. "They suppose that they could force all the parliamentarians to swear to the constitution before they assume their positions. However that is impossible. The Cortes have to function under the present rules which say nothing about the subject. And if it were necessary to change them, that reform should be made with the parliamentarians elected on 1 March who would have already assumed their seat. Therefore, there is a legal contradiction there which is impossible to solve."

The idea of not sending their parliamentarians to the Cortes excites the Herri Batasuna spokesman. "Never has any party or movement of national liberation proposed the use of this political weapons," he emphasizes. "We are the most important national liberation movement of Europe and other regions of the world. Against odds we have emerged as a revolutionary movement, not in impoverished North Ireland but in the rich Basque Country. Certainly Euskadi is completely original and has a process absolutely incomparable with other national revolutionary processes. We have more revolutionary possibilities here than in any other part of the world."

But what are the aspirations of Herri Batasuna, a coalition of small parties without a sufficiently clear ideology--except that it declares itself to be Marxist-Leninist--without a revolutionary program, without a political plan for the future of Euskadi?

"That will come later as a result of the dialectic process. It cannot be prepared beforehand because the masses decided what they want while on the move. For the time being we shall restrict ourselves to making qualitative advances on the road toward the revolution and independence which cannot be recovered by the Spanish capitalist system. If we only ask for an increase in wages, that demand is absorbed by the system after the increase is granted. But if we demand things such as our own police or recognition of the right to self-determination of the Basque people, once this is obtained, the bourgeoisie cannot integrate that conquest into their systems of oppression," explains Lasagabaster.

And what if independence were to be given them tomorrow? "We would accept it, of course," they say, "but that is unrealistic. Independence for us means the same thing as socialism. We know that they are objectives which are not going to be attained in a short time."

The spokesman for the nationalist coalition insists: "But history does not stop, systems become exhausted and capitalism shall be overcome on a world scale. It will be then that the working class will carry out the revolutionary process of transformation of structures, and both objectives

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will be attained. Meanwhile, what we are seeking is to make qualitative advances along that road."

**Silence and Fear**

With its proposals, between utopian and revolutionary, Herri Batasuna has become the mandatory point of reference for the majority of the other parties in the Basque Country. The potential capacity for mobilization of the Marxist nationalists in the light of the 1 March electoral results, disturbs more than one person. This is not particularly true of the majority force in the zone, the PNV, which remains confident that through its formulas for obtaining a statute of autonomy it will finally attain its objectives.

"The solutions sought by Herri Batasuna," says the official spokesman of the part of Sabino Arana, Inaki Anasagasti, "are not very realistic and frankly demagogic."

Anasagasti prefers to shrug his shoulders with respect to plans for a Basque assembly of the nationalist left. "They will continue their life, which we shall not join," he states. "On the contrary, we reaffirm the existence of the statute of autonomy presented by the General Basque Council to the previous Cortes.

"The assembly of Basque parliamentarians will meet next Tuesday, the 20th, to ratify that draft plan. And from there, moreover, we shall promote it so that once and for all the government of Madrid will understand that there are two alternatives remaining here: either they allow Herri Batasuna to radicalize the situation by continuing things as they are now, or it begins to negotiate seriously and ceases closing political paths to us."

**"Not Even the Most Elementary Aspects"**

The delays and refusals by the UCD to seek a path for immediate negotiations are, in the view of the PNV, extremely dangerous. "We are convinced that they do not understand even the most elementary aspects of the Basque problem in Madrid. This is not a problem of government but an affair of state which concerns all of Spain. If the UCD continues to place obstacles before the statute of autonomy, the only thing it will conclude by demonstrating is that the only thing that works here is armed struggle," says Anasagasti.

The UCD plans, however, are very different from those Basque nationalism hopes for. "The government party," emphasizes UCD Deputy Julen Guimon from Vizcaya, "is not willing to accept the draft plan of an agreement with the new correlation of forces resulting from the recent parliamentary elections."

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Apparently, however, they will find no one with whom to negotiate anything because the situation presents itself as a dialog of the deaf. "We cannot give up even one comma in the draft plan and the UCD should make a note of this," emphasizes the PNV spokesman.

The Basque nationalists are not alone against the UCD. Other than Herri Batasuna, the rest of the political parties of the zone, which have obtained legislative representatives in the recent elections, are prepared to reaffirm the draft plan of the Basque General Council next 20 March in the assembly of Basque parliamentarians.

"To reject our political solutions is suicide," insists Anasagasti. "However, they still believe in Madrid that the Basque question is resolved as if it were an abcess, isolating it and smashing it. And they are profoundly mistaken."

Carlos Garaicoechea, president of the PNV, warned Adolfo Suarez of this in Caracas last week during a brief meeting on the occasion of the inauguration of the new Venezuelan president: "Either you decide to act as a statesman and not like a government man, day by day, or the situation in Euskadi will be definitively beyond redemption."

The UCD does not believe that is so. As far as UCD Deputy Julien Guimon is concerned, the situation is only "worrisome." He said: "Herri Batasuna has reached its peak and cannot advance any more. Anyway, let them do as they please, we are going to respect the constitution and make it be respected."

#### Fragile Coexistence

The PSOE Socialists, meanwhile, are still not sure. Not yet recovered from the frustration of the last elections, they are reluctant to utter opinions on the abertzale left. But they do not hide their unease. "We do not have any statements to make," said the irritated Basque "minister" of interior, Jose Maria Benegas, leader of the PSOE, "If they want to know something, let them ask Herri Batasuna."

The Spanish Basque right, grouped in the Statutory Union for the last elections (made up of personalities from the Popular Alliance), believes that the political situation of the zone is "very grave." A prominent leader who preferred to remain unknown warned CAMBIO 16: "The deterioration of coexistence in the Basque Country can reach unsuspected limits."

#### Frightened Capital

In business circles, alarm and fears are growing in view of the somber prospects appearing in Euskadi. "If there are no negotiations, the only thing that can be expected here is that the increase in violence will run parallel to the economic deterioration of the region," said a metal industrialist of Vizcaya.

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The majority of business leaders contacted by this magazine declined to making statements "under these circumstances," "at least until the picture clears up a bit and we know which way this thing is going," as was said by another industrialist in the Vizcaya chamber of commerce, who refused to give his name.

The fears appear to be justified. Filled with victorious euphoria, the nationalists of Herri Batasuna, confident of their capacity for mobilization and of the support they expect to receive in the municipal elections, show their toughness: "We are not going to allow ourselves to be assimilated, nor will we ever become assimilated into the system of capitalist exploitation unless they exterminate us," declared the spokesman of the Marxist coalition.

**Arrigorriaga: We Are All Nationalists**

A few kilometers from Bilbao, near the Nervio River, Arrigorriaga is a typically Vizcayan industrial town which became famous in recent months. It was there that Argala, leader of the military ETA, who was blown up in Anglet, France, last 21 December, the victim of assassination, was born, lived and is buried. A few days after his death, on Christmas Eve, the Forces of Public Order militarily occupied the town to prevent a large gathering of ETA sympathizers. Perhaps as a reply, Herri Batasuna obtained the majority of votes in the legislative elections of 1 March.

With 18 fewer votes (out of a census of 7,000 voters) the Basque Nationalist Party obtained a close second place. "We are all nationalists here," warns Enrique Olivares who was in charge of the PNV municipal election campaign in Arrigorriaga. "This was the sanctuary for Argala, who was a friend of all, a true leader who was above any party loyalty, an eminently nationalist patriot. The only thing the Forces of Order achieved on Christmas Eve, was to radicalize the population."

However, the differences between the left and nationalism in Arrigorriaga appears to lessen. "The goals pursued by Herri Batasuna are the same we are trying to achieve," said Olivares. "What differentiates us is that the we of the PNV are not Marxist-Leninists nor do we favor armed struggle."

However, in the coming elections the victory will be obtained by Basque nationalism, according to Patxi Ochoa Pena, number one in the PNV candidacy in Arrigorriaga, "A vote for Herri Batasuna is not a stable vote but a visceral vote. Many persons who are not Marxists voted for them out of pure indignation. There may now be youths who are enthusiastic about the Herri Batasuna idea of holding a Basque assembly. In the long run, however, the PNV will obtain a majority because its candidates are honest people and known in the town," warns Ochoa.

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Eibar Does Not Proclaim the Republic

Next 14 April the town of Eibar in Guipuzcoana will celebrate the 48th anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic. It has a good reason for doing so. In 1931 it was the first town government of the country, which after municipal elections, proclaimed the second Spanish Republic, which won for it the award of "very exemplary city." Almost 48 years later, with only 10 days of difference, the people of Eibar returned to the polls "as on that occasion" to elect councilmen and mayors for their city governments. But this time regardless of who is elected, they will not repeat history. It is unlikely that any other Spanish city would follow them in a republican proclamation.

If the Socialists win, "republicans at heart but monarchists in constitution," in the words of one candidate, they will not do it, of course, and will make all their efforts for recovering for Eibar the characteristics of a "livable city," which it had when it was republic, and which it has lost because of an unbridled growth in the years which have passed since those municipal elections.

The PSOE Socialists received 4,233 votes in the legislative elections of 1 March, only 49 more votes than their direct opponent, the Basque Nationalist Party.

If the PNV won, it would not proclaim the Republic either and of course neither would the UCD, the third force in the past elections; not even Herri Batasuna, the fourth force with 2,778 votes, would do it, "no matter how much we would like to."

One of those who will go to the polls this time, as he did then, will be Benigno Bascaran, nicknamed the "lay priest," member of the executive committee of the Euskadi Socialist Party (PSOE) and son of a Socialist councilman elected in 1931.

He relates: "They came looking for my father and me that day at 0600 because a full meeting of the city council had been scheduled for 0700. The members of the body, with the exception of the nationalist councilman, met for half an hour. Meanwhile, people began to arrive at the square and were looking at the window of the government building. Shortly afterward, it opened, a manifesto was read in which the results of the election were corroborated and the Republic was proclaimed. The tricolor flag was raised at 0730 while the people sang and cried with happiness."

The moments of happiness, however, were followed by moments of unease. After the proclamation, telephone calls were made to other city governments of the zone and to the capital, San Sebastian. They talked with other Spanish cities and no one knew the electoral results and, therefore, the Republic had not been proclaimed. Uneasy, the councilmen of Eibar decided to commission the youngest of them to go to the Civil Guard barracks, where



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the chief of the post, Adolfo Munoz, told him that he knew nothing about the Republic being proclaimed.

The euphoria began to disappear as contacts continued to be fruitless. Ten hours later, at 1700, Barcelona followed the steps of the Basques and also proclaimed the end of the monarchy.

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